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ABSTRACT. Any reforms of pension systems inevitably 
involve their optimization, which is a challenging task since 
pension systems are dynamic, multidimensional and are 
affected by a variety of demographic, investment-related, 
and institutional random impact factors. The model 
described in this article aims at demonstrating the 
dependence of the target functions of pension systems on 
such factors. The current research sheds light on the 
influence of demographic parameters on funded and 
unfunded pension systems and shows the importance of 
institutional risks in both types of systems. The values of 
the state-regulated parameters for 2030 are specified, 
which allows us to maximize the key target functions: the 
replacement rate and pension benefits. Further, the results 
of empirical analysis of the impact factors affecting 
pension systems of OECD countries are described. The 
novelty of the paper lies in the analytical and quantitative 
methods used for the optimization of the pension system 
on the basis of the replacement rate 
JEL Classification: G23, 
H55, H75 
Keywords: pension systems; demographic risks; investment risks; 
institutional risks; reforms 
Introduction 
The optimization of pension systems is not a new question in economics. 
Demographic transformations necessitate constant adjustment and regular reformation of 
pension systems in almost all developed countries. All policy-makers, however, have to deal 
with the following question: what parameters should be set for the pension system and which 
type of system – funded or unfunded – should be prioritized. Modern economists have also 
studied this dilemma: various articles discuss the influence of factors on the operation of 
pension systems and on the economic environment.  
The main risks to which pension systems are subject are demographic risks such as the 
increasing life expectancy, the growing number of retirees and the falling number of 
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contributors to the pension system (Debon et al., 2008). To ensure the growth of the key 
parameters of pension systems, it is necessary to manage these risks efficiently.As far as the 
optimization of pension systems is concerned, we distinguish three major approaches in the 
existing studies. Studies adhering to the first approach Capretta et al. (2006) and Bosworth 
and Kent (2011) deal with self-adjusting pension systems. The problem, however, is that these 
studies do not take into account the dynamic nature of impact factors. The second approach 
strives to offer solutions tailored to the specific problems of pension systems (Holzmann, 
2005). These studies focus on the probabilistic characteristics of certain factors while ignoring 
others (Holzmann, 2005). The third approach is the closest to our own as it uses OLG models 
to consider a pension system in a comprehensive, complex way. The studies adopting this 
approach take into account the dynamics of impact factors and aim to optimize the system by 
redistributing the resources between generations (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).   
The primary goal of our research is to develop a pension system model which takes 
into account the joint impact of core factors with probabilistic characteristics. This is then 
used to determine the values of the state-regulated parameters for 2030, which allows us to 
maximize the objective functions. Thus, we will be able to determine the values of the 
pension system's control parameters to maximize the objective function.  
The novelty of this paper lies in the fact that we are optimizing the pension system 
while not relying on the Pareto principal. In our understanding, optimality is a system with a 
combination of parameter values that maximizes the objective function of the system. 
Equally, we perform an optimization of the system with the reallocation of resources inside 
one generation, not between generations as occurs in OLG models. As objective functions of 
the pension system, we have chosen the value of pension benefits and the replacement rate, 
which are recommended by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as the main 
functions of pension provision.  For a more detailed description of the abbreviations, please 
see the Appendix 2. The retirement age, the yield from the investment of pension assets in the 
storage system, the share of the mandatory funded pension in the pension system and the 
share of able-bodied citizens participating in the mandatory funded system are the regulation 
parameters in the proposed model. Parameters such as the share of the mandatory funded 
pension in the pension system and the share of able-bodied citizens participating in the 
mandatory funded system are considered institutional. The proposed model has the following 
limitations: the objective functions are maximized by redistributing resources inside one 
generation; the dynamics of the demographic factors are studied by analyzing changes in the 
demographic parameters over the past period in the given group of countries; and the 
dynamics of investment factors are studied by analyzing the changes in the investment factors 
over the past period in the given country. One more limitation concerns the institutional 
factors, which are considered only to a limited extent.  
Despite its limitations, our model enables us to analyze the dynamic impact of 
investment and demographic factors, taking into account a limited number of institutional 
factors. This allows us to redistribute resources inside the generation to maximize the 
objective function of a pension system – the replacement rate.  
This article is structured as follows. The model of the pension system and the process 
of modelling are described in Section 2. An overview of the characteristics of the Russian 
pension system is given in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the optimization of the pension 
system’s regulated parameters and provides further discussion of this problem. In Section 5, 
we offer our conclusions.  
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1.1. Literature review 
In 1995, the crisis in the pension system caused by changes in life expectancy and the 
retirement age led to a wave of forecasts predicting further destabilization of distribution 
pension systems if the increases in the retirement age failed to match the corresponding 
increases in life expectancy. According to the forecasts (James, 1995), more than 19% of the 
world population would be over 60 years old by 2030, compared to 9% in 1995.  
The demographic risks and their influence on pension systems have been thoroughly 
discussed Wills and Sherris (2010), which structures demographic risks, calculates them on 
the basis of the data provided by the National Statistical Service of Australia and concludes 
that there is a direct correlation between the successful management of pension funds and life 
insurance companies and the efficient management of demographic risks. The authors also 
propose that we take demographic risks into account in the computation of the costs of 
pension and life insurance products and also conduct securitization of demographic risks in 
the pension insurance sector. Issues of demographic risk management in pension and 
insurance sectors were discussed Debon et al. (2008), where the authors also propose 
applying a time series model for the analysis of demographic risks. The management of 
demographic risks in the pension and insurance institutions of South Korea in the gender 
context and in the context of long-term retirement has been studied Kwon (2008). It has been 
found that the increase in the time invested in caring for elderly people in the hospitals 
implies an increase in life expectancy, which in turn implies an increase in the demographic 
risks. The problems of actuarial calculations in the conditions of demographic risks are 
discussed Cossette et al. (2007), where a relation model of the prediction of mortality rates 
and its influence on the pension plan is proposed using Poisson regression analysis. 
Management of interest-rate and inflation risks in pension and insurance sectors is 
investigated Bikker and Vlaar (2007), where it is proposed to create reserve funds in pension 
institutions to minimize the impact of risks on their financial performance.  
In terms of pension system optimization, the existing research can be divided into 
three major strands: those with a focus on the self-adjustment mechanisms of a pension 
system; those with optimal solutions for the specific problems of a pension system; and those 
dealing with a pension system as a whole. The research targeted at finding mechanisms for 
the self-adjustment of pension systems is usually based on balance models creating 
equilibrium of input and output in the system. In case of imbalance, the chosen control 
parameters are modified in order to bring the system into equilibrium. To minimize the 
impact of demographic risks, experts for the World Bank propose to restructure the pension 
system by infusing into the PAYG a funded component. While doing this, it is recommended 
not to replace the PAYG system completely with the funded one, but only part of it: the 
remaining part of the PAYG system should cover deficits in reallocations within and between 
generations, smoothing changes during a lifetime, etc. (Holzmann, 2005). The probable 
minimization of demographic risks in Latin America during the reformation of the PAYG 
system and the introduction of a multicomponent system that incorporates a funded part into 
the PAYG component has been discussed Fox and Palmer (2001). The social implications of 
this restructuring are discussed in the political documents of the World Bank (Schwarz and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 1999) and (Barrientos et al., 2003). As for the Russian system (Gurvich, 
2010), provides significant research on inflation and interest-rate risks, where the replacement 
rate is considered the main criterion of the social development of pension systems. The paper 
seeks to prove that in order to maintain the replacement rate and the sustainability of a 
pension system, it is essential to increase the subsidies from the federal budget by one 
percentage point of the GDP every five years and to annually increase the rates of pension 
contributions by one percentage point. Relying on this analysis of the demographic indicators 
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of OECD countries and the countries of emerging markets (using the author’s own 
terminology), the author proposes to raise the retirement age to 62 for men and 60 for women. 
To prove this point, the average time span during which people receive pension benefits in the 
countries studied is highlighted. Similarly, Kudrin and Gurvich (2012) contends that the 
optimal reaction of the state to increasing average life expectancy should be to conduct 
constant adjustment of the retirement age while maintaining the proportion between the length 
of working life and the length of retirement. Such strategy provides the stability of the 
replacement rate and does not change the balance of relationships between the generations. A 
series of papers discuss annuitization and the functioning of pension institutions in the 
conditions of market risks. For example, Davidoff et al. (2005) analyzes the impact of 
behavioral patterns on the market prospects of pension insurance products. Another approach 
has been proposed Vidal-Melia et al., 2006), where the authors study and adopt the Value-at-
Risk (VaR) method to estimate the impact of macro-economic risks on the insurance and 
pension industries. The authors calculated the cost performance of macro-economic risks and 
VaR in order to determine their impact on the internal rate of return (IRR). This study holds a 
significant practical value for the insurance and pension industries since they act both as 
objects of investment and as objects of state regulation. The social aspect of this research is 
very important: the authors determined the impact of macro-economic risks on the 
replacement rate (RR), which is the main indicator recommended by the International Labour 
Organization to estimate the living standards of retired citizens. It is worth mentioning that 
Fehr (2000) discusses the optimization of private pension plans. Their results might be 
applied to social (obligatory) systems. By doing this, one needs to pay attention to the 
differences between systems. In particular, pension systems should take care of the financing 
of special categories of residents, such as the disabled. From the other side, social systems 
might have an additional source of financing from the government budget to cover different 
types of risks. More than half of OECD countries apply compensatory actions to minimize the 
exposure of pension systems to risks (D’Addio and Whitehouse, 2012; Bosworth and Kent, 
2011). Such activities provide balance to the system by adjusting the retirement age (Capretta 
et al., 2006; Fudenberg. and Tirole, 1991), automatically balancing the size of contributions 
(Bosworth and Kent, 2011; Haberman and Zimbidis, 2002; Devolder et al., 2003) and 
optimizing pension systems by combining the optimal management of the investment assets 
of pension funds with the formation of an optimal payout policy (Haberman and Vigna, 2002; 
Devolder et al., 2003). The disadvantage of such an automatic adjustment mechanism is the 
absence of the complex, systemic approach: instead, it focuses only on the calibration of one 
or several parameters. Moreover, such mechanisms do not consider the volatilities of the 
individual factors of interest. Most interesting are works on the optimization of the pension 
system as one object with exogenous and regulatory factors of influence. The OLG model by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1985) uses the notion of general equilibrium to maximize social 
welfare under certain restrictions. Bouchet et al. (2014) calibrates the aforementioned model 
and finds the optimal state of the pension system for the example of Luxembourg. In this case, 
the pension system was not considered to be autonomous, but rather as part of the global 
system interconnected by macroeconomic parameters. The model, however, considers the 
system as static, not allowing for dynamic changes. In particular, one cannot increase the 
retirement age or make possible changes in the relationship between unfunded and funded 
systems. The dynamics of the pension systems were considered by Godınez-Olivares et al. 
(2016), among others, which proposes approaches to the calibration of the optimal values of 
payments, retirement ages and indexation of the payments for the PAYG system, taking into 
account life expectancy, birth rate and salary increases. Billig and Menard (2013) took into 
account not only demographic but also four macroeconomic and institutional factors, namely 
the ratio of the funded to the unfunded parts in the obligatory pension system. Pantelous and 
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Zimbidis (2008) proposes a stochastic model for the PAYG system, which has the form of a 
matrix for a set of pension plans. This is summarized in analytical equations that take into 
account the connection of target functions and parameters of influence. To summarize, the 
influence of specific factors on pension systems has received extensive coverage in the 
modern research literature. Many authors have put forward models for the optimization of 
pension systems, which demonstrates the importance of this problem. At the same time, the 
works cited above reveal an underexplored area since they consider pension systems either as 
stationary, without taking into account their constant change, or as dynamic but affected only 
by one specific kind of risk. Furthermore, these studies do not consider the probability factor 
of relevant impact factors. Studies addressing the optimization of pension plans as multifactor 
systems use the retirement age and/or investment returns as control parameters. We believe 
that a small number of control parameters significantly reduced their impact on pension 
systems. Therefore, it is essential to consider a wider range of control parameters. When 
solving the problem of the optimal pension system, the Pareto principal is widely used. Based 
on this, a system achieves its optimum when any further gains by any of the players are due to 
the losses of some of the other players (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Based on this principle, 
the optimal reallocation of goods between generations while forming the pension system 
(Peters, 1991; Raut, 1992) and reforming the system of social benefits was proposed (Belan et 
al., 1998). Afterwards, the Pareto effectiveness was applied to solve similar problems of the 
reallocation of goods between generations using OLG-models (Wrede, 1999; Roberts, 2013). 
Based on the Pareto effectiveness, Breyer (1989) and Gyarfas and Marquardt (2001) proposed 
methods to look at the relationship between PAYG and a funded system, while Brunner 
(1996) discussed the necessity of moving from PAYG to a funded system, taking into account 
the effects of reallocations between generations. Using Pareto law, Kudrna and, Woodland 
(2011) and Fehr (2000) predicted the results of pension reforms in Australia and Germany, 
respectively. The primary goal of our research is to develop a pension system model which 
takes into account the joint impact of the core factors with probabilistic characteristics. It is 
then used to determine the values of state-regulated parameters for 2030, which allows us to 
maximize the objective functions. The novelty of this paper consists of the fact that we are 
optimizing the pension system without relying on the Pareto principle. In our understanding, 
optimality is a system with a combination of parameter values that maximizes the objective 
function of the system. We also perform an optimization of the system by reallocation of the 
resources inside one generation rather than between generations, as in OLG models. As 
objective functions of the pension system, we have chosen the value of pension benefits and 
the replacement rate, which are recommended by the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
as the main functions of pension provision (see www.ilo.org). The retirement age, the yield 
from the investment of pension assets in the storage system, the share of mandatory funded 
pensions in the pension system and the share of able-bodied citizens participating in the 
mandatory funded system are regulation parameters in the proposed model.  
1.2. Characteristics of the Russian Pension System: an Overview 
The pension system in Russia consists of mandatory and voluntary (additional) 
pension insurance. Voluntary pension insurance is based on a contract relationship between 
the insuring party, the insured person and non-state (private) pension funds. Contributions to 
voluntary pension schemes can be made by private individuals or legal entities. In the latter 
case, corporate pension schemes are set up. There are also mixed pension schemes, in which 
contributions can be made both by employees and their employers. Mandatory pension 
insurance is regulated by the law and is compulsory for the working population. Employers 
are liable to pay contributions for their employees to the pension fund at the rate of 22% of 
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workers’ taxable income. Out of 22%, 6% goes to the funded pension component while the 
other 16%, to the unfunded component. The funded component consists of the funds 
accumulated on the individual accounts of insured persons. This money is invested and the 
investments return is allocated among the individual accounts.  
Funds transferred to individual accounts are invested by specially authorized 
companies – non-state pension funds and managing companies. The returns on the investment 
are credited to individual pension accounts after the commission is charged by the pension 
company. The rules of investment are set by the regulator – the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation – and prescribed by Federal Law № 111.1 Russian pension funds have 
demonstrated negative investment inflation-adjusted returns from 2004 to 2015, – 4.57% a 
year.2 As we have shown previously, these results can be explained by the inefficient 
performance of the regulator (Pantelous and Zimbidis, 2008).  
The unfunded component of the pension is based on a scoring system, which turns 
insured persons’ revenues into scoring points. The value of a pension point is determined by 
the state, depending on the current economic situation. Funds from the unfunded pension 
component are used to provide pensions to present-day retirees. The retirement age in Russia 
is 60 for men and 55 for women. Some people can take early retirement due to hazardous or 
harmful work conditions which reduce life expectancy: for example, people working in the 
extreme north or beyond the Arctic circle are entitled to early retirement (45 for women and 
50 for men). Furthermore, people of certain professions, such as pilots and flight attendants, 
are also entitled to early retirement schemes. Such preferential pensions are paid from the 
general fund, which puts a heavy burden on the compulsory pension system. In the framework 
of the PAYG system, pension payments from the federal budget are made to the specific 
categories of residents who do not receive rights to the types of pension payments listed 
above. To these categories belong age pensions, pensions to federal social workers and 
pensions for disabled residents. The average pension amount in the compulsory pension 
system in Russia was 10,900 roubles in 2014, or 354.4 dollars with a replacement rate of 
34%. The average pension was 13,100 roubles, or 210.8 dollars, as of 23.10.2016 (at the 
currency rate of 23.10.2016), while the replacement rate dropped to 32%. By replacement 
rate, we mean not the classical definition given by convention N102 of the ILO, but the 
relationship of the average pension payment to the average salary. This is because the lack of 
statistical data for the Russian Federation requires the development of the model.  
Another serious problem faced by the Russian pension system is demographic change. 
One of the key characteristics of the demographic risks faced by pension systems is the ratio 
of workers to retirees in the economy, which changed from 5.86 in 1990 to 5.11 in 2015 
(OECD, 2013): according to different forecasts, it may fall to 2.8-4.2 by 2030.3 This process 
is accompanied by the increased life expectancy of people reaching the age of 60. In 2015, 
life expectancy for women aged 60 was 84.5 years and for men, 81.5 years.4 
The demographic pressures, the decline in the working population and the increase in 
the number of retirees as well as considerable spending on preferential pensions require 
transfers from the federal budget to the budget of the Russian Pension Fund, the operator of 
                                                 
1 Federal Law of 24.07.2002 N 111-FZ (amended as of 01.12.2014) ‘On the Investment of Funds of the Funded 
Component of the Retirement Pension in the Russian Federation’.  
2 Data from the official website of the Russian Ministry of Finance: Access: www.minfin.ru. Last accessed: 
23/12/2015. 
3 According to the optimistic and pessimistic forecasts of the Russian Statistics Committee. Source: The Official 
Web-Site of the Russian Statistics Committee (Roskomstat). Access mode: 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/# last accessed 
date: 24.01.2018. 
4 The UN Forecast. Access mode: https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html). Last accessed date: 1.11.2017. 
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compulsory pension insurance. The amount of transfers in 2016 exceeded 1 trillion roubles, or 
15.9 billion dollars. Despite the substantial subsidies, in 2016 the budget of the Russian 
Pension Fund still ran a deficit of 175 billion roubles, or 2.7 billion dollars. To cover this 
deficit, it was proposed to abandon the funded component and redirect funds to the unfunded 
component, that is, for payments to current retirees. Compulsory pension insurance in Russia 
comprises of funded and unfunded components. We demonstrate that the funded component 
should be preserved and provide empirical evidence that an increase in the replacement rate to 
the minimum recommended by the ILO by 0.4 times can be achieved by adjusting control 
parameters such as investment returns, the ratio of the funded and unfunded components in 
the contributions to compulsory pension insurance and the retirement age. 
2. Model of a Pension System. Methodological Approach 
When developing an optimal pension system, it is essential to define what is meant by 
optimality. In this article, optimality refers to finding the values of the pension systems’ 
regulated parameters which in the current demographic, institutional and investment conditions will 
make it possible to maximize the system’s objective functions. The objective functions in our 
setup are the pension benefits and the replacement rate (RR). As the restriction for our model 
under RR, we understand the relation of the working pension on aging to the average salary. 
As mentioned above, there are other types of pension systems in the Russian Federation: this 
type, however has the largest weight. 
To determine the parameters of our pension system model, we summarized all the 
factors which were considered in the earlier works. These factors can be divided into the 
following groups: 
 demographic parameters, which include the period of pension payments, the 
period of pension savings and the numbers of the working population and 
retired citizens; 
 investment-based parameters, which include the rate of returns (as a decimal 
fraction) obtained from investing pension savings; 
 institutional parameters, which include the share of the population participating 
in voluntary savings schemes and the share of expenses for funding 
preferential pensions in the total expenditure of the state pension fund. 
Taken into account while constructing the model, these parameters can take values 
within specific ranges, which will be determined on the basis of the existing legal norms and 
the available statistical data. 
The RR is understood as the replacement rate of a pension, which characterises the 
ratio of pensions from funded (cumulative) and unfunded (distributive) systems to the average 
salary (S): RR = (PD + PC)/S. According to the Russian Pension Fund (see www.pfrf.ru), at 
present (as of 2014) the RR is RRi = 0.34. Pension payments in the unfunded system can be 
represented as the fraction (PD = P/n) of the sum of payments made into the unfunded 
pension system (P) over the number of citizens who receive pension payments (n). Payments 
into the pension system are made from properly indexed salaries (S) in fraction (s) paid by the 
working population (K) and are distributed in proportion X2 into the cumulative system and 
(1 − X2) into the unfunded system. The portion dm is also used to finance the management of 
the system, while portion dp goes to pension payments that do not have an insurable character 
(pensions for specific working conditions). Thus, the payments into the unfunded systems are 
calculated as PD = 1/n· S·s·K·(1-X2)(1-dm-dp). Payments from the funded pension system 
are made from the pension savings distributed over the average time of pension benefits (tν). 
Pension savings are formed from payments (s) and from properly indexed salaries (S), as well 
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as from investments profits over tn from the payments with an average investment rate X3. 
Payments from the funded system are given through PC = 1/tv·S·s·X2·∑ (1 + 𝑋3)
𝑞𝑡𝑛
𝑞=1 , 
therefore 
 
𝑅𝑅 =
1
𝑡𝑣
∙ 𝑠 ∙ 𝑋2∑ ((1 + 𝑋3)
𝑞 + 𝑠 ∙ (1 − 𝑋2
𝑡𝑛
𝑞=1 ) ∙
𝐾
𝑛
∙ (1 − 𝑑𝑝 − 𝑑𝑚)),             (1) 
 
where the average salary S has been cancelled out. Based on formula (1), we aim to maximise 
the replacement rate at year 2030 (RRj) relative to the replacement rate now (for the year 2014, 
RRi) via maximization of the RRj/RRi, taking into account that only fraction X4 of the 
working population is involved in the funded system. Then, the RR in the forecast period (as 
of 2030) is determined by function (2) below, which is used to solve the problem of the 
maximization of RRj for 2030 and find the optimal parameters for a pension system: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑗 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑋2
∑ (1+𝑋3𝑗)
𝑞
𝑡𝑛𝑗
𝑞=1
𝑡𝑣𝑗
𝑡𝑣𝑖
∑ (1+𝑋3𝑖)
𝑞
𝑡𝑛𝑖
𝑞=1
∙ 𝑋4 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖(1 − 𝑋2)
𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝑖
𝑛𝑖
𝑛𝑗
(1 − 𝑑𝑚 − 𝑑𝑝),   (2) 
 
Let us recall once more all the variables: RRi is the RR for the year 2014, X2 is the 
weight of the funded pension component, X3k is the returns from the investment of pension 
savings, tnk is the period of pension savings, tνk is the period of pension benefits, Kk is the 
working population, nk is the retired population, where k = i, j standing for years 2014 and 
2030 respectively, X4 is the average share of the population participating in savings 
accumulation, dm are the shares of management costs in the expenditure of the mandatory 
pension system and dp are the shares of preferential uninsurable pensions in the expenditure 
of the mandatory pension system. Indices m and f will be introduced shortly to distinguish 
between the male and female fractions of the population. 
According to the United Nations (see https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html), in 
2014 men’s and women’s life expectancy at age 60 years was 21.55 and 24.56 years 
respectively (we restrict ourselves to 60 years for both for men and women in order to use 
existing data). This results in the life expectancies Li,m = 60 + 21.55 = 81.55 and Li,f = 60 + 
24.56 = 84.56 years for men and women. Using a proportional increase of the prediction from 
SSA5 , we obtain an increase by the factor 1.09 for life expectancy after reaching 60 years, 
which results in Lj,m = 60 + 22.64 = 82.64 and Lj,f = 60 + 25.65 = 85.65 years for men and 
women. The effective retirement age (X1,k,f , X1,k,m, k = i, j) typically depends on life 
expectancy and on the development level of the country: it is the age when the insured person 
is entitled to receiving his/her work pension. As for 2014, the effective retirement age was 
X1,m = 54.5 and X1,f = 52.6 years for men and women respectively, where, as mentioned 
above, index m stands for male and f for female. For 2030, the prospective retirement age is 
assumed to take random values in the range X1,j,m ∈ (Li,m; Lj,m) for men and X1,j,f ∈ (Li,f ; Lj,f ) 
for women. Taking into consideration possible changes of the effective retirement ages (X1,j) 
in the future, the period of pension benefits in 2030 for men will be tνj,m = 82.64 − X1,j,m  
years; for women, it will be tνj ,f  = 85.65 − X1,j,f  years. 
The period of pension savings (tnk , k = i, j) is the period when regular contributions 
are made to funded pension systems, thus its length is computed as the difference between the 
effective retirement age and the age of entry into working life (we use the average value 
24.4 years for 2014), namely tnk = X1,k − 24.4. Thus, for 2014 pension savings periods were 
                                                 
5 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population 
Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition. 
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tni,m = 60 − 24.4 = 35.6 and tni,f = 55 − 24.4 = 30.6 years for men and women respectively. The 
predicted values of the period of pension savings are computed in the same manner, by using 
future effective retirement age X1,j. 
The working population (Kk, k = i, j) consists of employed citizens who can make 
insurance payments into the pension system. In 2014, the working population was Ki = 86 106 
citizens. According to the pessimistic forecast of the Federal Public Statistics Service (FPSS), 
the working population as of 2030 will be Kj,p = 73 106, while according to its optimistic 
forecast, it will be Kj,o = 80 106 citizens. The number of retired citizens (nk, k = i, j) in the 
current setup corresponds to the number of receivers of the unfunded component of pensions. 
At present, the number of retired citizens is ni = 32 106 citizens. According to the pessimistic 
forecast of the FPSS, the number of pensioners in 2030 will be nj,p = 36 106 while according 
to its optimistic forecast, it will be nj,o = 41 106 citizens. 
The share of the general expenses of the Russian Pension Fund (RPF) is an indicator 
which characterizes institutional risks, that is, expenses related to the institutional system of 
pension fund regulation. These expenses are comprised of the share of management expenses 
(dm, the ratio of management expenses to the sum of all the RPF’s expenses) and the share of 
preferential uninsurable pensions (dp, the ratio of the sum of preferential pensions (all 
pensions, except for unfunded, funded and basic) to the sum of all RPF’s expenses). The 
calculations were made on the basis of the budget of the Pension Fund of the Russian 
Federation as of 2014 (see the Russian Federal Law No 385-FZ of 01.12.2014 “On the Budget 
of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation for 2014 and for the Years under Planning 2015 
and 2016”), with the  share of general expenses dm + dp = 0.0247. 
For a more detailed description of the variable, please see the Appendix 1.  
The variables that can be regulated by the state are called institutional variables (param- 
eters). They can be used to maximize the objective functions, pension payments and the RR. 
Such variables include the effective retirement age (X1); the weight of the funded pension com- 
ponent (X2); investment returns from pension savings in the future (X3); and the average share of 
the population taking part in the funded pension system (X4). 
Investment returns (X3k, k = i, j) are the real (exceeding inflation) returns obtained 
from investing the funded pension component. The current investment returns (X3i) are the 
average returns of all management companies in the period between 2004 and 2014, which 
were X3i =−0.004 per annum (Nepp, 2013, see Graph 2). Investment returns in the future (X3j) 
are the forecast returns from management of the funded pension component for 2030. To find 
the investment returns in the future, we use the results of the modelled investment portfolio, 
which has demonstrated investment returns in the amount of 10.7% if institutional barriers are 
removed. We have taken the long-term level of inflation as 5.83%. Thus, the real investment 
returns of this investment portfolio were set at the rate of X3j = 0.0487 (Nepp, 2013). In our model 
of a pension system with maximized pension benefits and RR, the investment returns for 2030 
can take any values in the range of X3j ∈ (−1%; 0.38%). The weight of the funded pension 
component is defined as X2 ∈ (0; 1), where for X2 = 0 no contributions are paid and for X2 = 1 
there is no distribution pension, namely 100% of contributions go to the funded pension 
system. 
The average share of the population participating in the funded pension system (X4 ∈ (0, 1)) 
is the population covered by the funded pension system. For X4 = 0 nobody participates in 
funded pension systems and for X4 = 1 100% of the population participate in funded pension 
systems. 
Thus, simplifying the sums via geometric progression and denoting 
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𝐴 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖
𝑡𝑣𝑖𝑋3𝑖
(1+𝑋3𝑖){(1+𝑋3𝑖)
𝑡𝑛𝑖−1}
, 
 
𝐵 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝐾𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑛𝑖
(1 − 𝑑𝑚 − 𝑑𝑝) 
 
𝐹(𝑋1, 𝑋3) =
(1+𝑋3){(1+𝑋3)
𝑋1−24,4−1}
𝑋3(𝐿𝑗−𝑋1)
,   (3) 
 
formula (2) is thus simplified to 
 
RRj(X1j , X2j , X3j , X4j) = X2j{A · X4j · F (X1j , X3j) − B} + B,                      (4) 
 
where the constants A and B are computed according to the systems’s fixed parameters, and 
therefore  
 
𝐴𝑚 = 0.34
(81.55 − 54.5)(−0.004)
(1 − 0.004){(1 − 0.004)(54.5−24.4) − 1}
= 0.3239, 𝐴𝑓 = 0.34
(84.56 − 52.6)(−0.004)
0.996{0.996(52.5−24.4) − 1}
= 0.4092, 
 
𝐵𝑝 = 0.34
86∙106
73∙106
36∙106
32∙106
(1 − 0.0247) = 0.4394862  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐵𝑜 = 0.34
86∙106
80∙106
41∙106
32∙106
(1 − 0.0247) = 0.4567299 . 
 
To sum up, function (4) depends on four variables: X1, the effective retirement age in 
the future; X2, the weight of the funded component in the future; X3, the investment returns in 
the future; and X4, the average share of people participating in the funded component in the 
future. As can be seen from (4), the dependence of the resulting function of variables X2 and 
X4, characterizing the volume of the funded component of the pension system, is linear while 
the impact of the investment returns and the effective retirement age is described by internal 
function F (X1, X3). 
Let us study (3) in the range of possible values of variables X1j and X3j. The maximum 
of RRj is reached if the values of internal function F (X1j, X3j) are positive, which determines 
the analyzed range of variable X1, as directly implied from (3) and (4): 
 
RRj → max,  for F (X1j, X3j) > 0,  if X1i < X1j < Lj ,                  (5) 
 
According to (3) and (4), the value of the function grows exponentially, with effective 
retirement age X1 approaching a value equal to life expectancy at the age of 60 years Lj in the 
forecasted period. It means that RR in the future (RRj) can be maximized (increased) 
primarily through increasing the effective retirement age. Importantly, the effective retirement 
age in the future must not exceed the average life expectancy at 60 years Lj (for men Lj,m = 
82.64 and for women Lj,f = 85.65 years). 
A change of effective retirement age X1j within the given range [X1i; Lj] will affect 
RRj in the following way: 
 
𝑋1𝑖<𝑋1𝑗<𝐿𝑗;
𝑋1𝑗→𝐿𝑗
} => 𝐹 (𝑋1𝑗 , 𝑋3𝑗) → ∞ => 𝑅𝑅𝑗 → ∞                  (6) 
 
This means that if we raise effective retirement age X1j within the range [X1i; Lj], 
function F (X1j, X3j) will grow, which will lead to an increase in RRj. In the extreme case, 
with X1j approaching Lj, function F (X1j, X3j) will tend to infinity and, consequently, target 
function RRj will blow up. 
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Let us analyze the values of X1j in function (3), for which the target function (4) will 
be minimal. As is seen from (3), function F (X1j, X3j) has an unremovable discontinuity of the 
second type at the point X1j = Lj, when the effective retirement age equals the average life 
expectancy at 60 years Lj in the forecasted period. When X1j exceeds the average life 
expectancy, function F (X1j, X3j) became negative, which results in a reduction in the target 
function. This range of values is not discussed here because it is senseless from an economic 
point of view. The model under consideration is limited by condition X1 < Lj. 
On the other hand, if the future effective retirement age X1j goes below the current 
level (54.5 for men and 52.6 for women) and reaches the level of entry into working life 
(24.4), this will lead to a fall in function F (X1j, X3j), which, in turn, will lead to a dramatic 
decrease in RRj: 
 
𝑋1𝐽 < 𝐿𝐽;
𝑋1𝑗 → 24.4;
𝑋1𝑗 > 24.4
} => 𝐹 (𝑋1𝑗 , 𝑋3𝑗)min => 𝑅𝑅𝑗 → 𝑚𝑖𝑛                (7) 
 
Let us focus on the dependence of function F (X1j, X3j) on variable X3j, which corresponds to 
the returns from investments of pension savings in the forecast period. As can be seen from 
(3) and (4), the function rises within the whole range of values of investment returns and has 
an unremovable discontinuity of the first kind at the point of zero returns. 
 
X1j = Lj ⇒ F (X1j, X3j) = ∞ ⇒ RRj = ∞. 
 
The analysis shows that the higher the effective retirement age, the stronger the 
function’s dependence on investment returns. This has a positive effect on the target function 
since an increase in investment returns leads to an increase in RR. Therefore: 
 
𝑋3𝑗 ↑=> 𝐹 (𝑋1𝑗 , 𝑋3𝑗) → ∞ => 𝑅𝑅𝑗 → ∞                     (8) 
𝑋1𝑗 < 𝐿𝑗
𝑋3𝑗 → 0
𝑋3𝑗 ≥ 0
} => 𝐹 (𝑋1𝑗 , 𝑋3𝑗) → ∞ => 𝑅𝑅𝑗 → ∞ 
 
This can be simply seen from the fact that ∂F (x1, x3)/∂x3 = (1 + x3)x1−25.4{x1 − 24.4 + 
(x1 − 25.4)/x3}, which is obviously positive, since all the constituents are positive. 
Considering expressions (3) and (4) investigated how function F (X1j, X3j) and RRj depend on 
the two variables (the effective retirement age (X1j) and the investment returns of the funded 
pension component  (X3j)), let us discuss how the proportion of the population participating in 
the funded pension system, X4j, affects the target function and find the range of values of this 
variable which make the target function rise. Expression (4) shows that RR can be maximized 
if we get a positive value of the multiplier in curly brackets of (4): 
 
{A · X4j · F (X1j, X3j) − B} > 0 and X2 → 1 => RRj → ∞.                   (9) 
 
As shown above, function F (X1j, X3j) is positive for all values of X1j and X3j in the specified 
ranges. Constants A and B are also positive. Therefore, to maximize the target function the 
following inequality should be satisfied: 
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𝐹 (𝑋1𝑗 , 𝑋3𝑗) ∙ 𝑋4𝑗 >
𝐵
𝐴
  . 
 
The relation of constants B/A calculated on the basis of the pension system’s main 
indicators is equal to 1.4103 (optimistic forecast and male population) 1.1163 (optimistic 
forecast and female population), 1.3569 (pessimistic forecast and male population) and 
1.0740 (pessimistic forecast and female population). Then the lower limit of the value range 
for variable X4j can be calculated according as follows: 
 
𝑋4𝑗 > 𝑋4𝑗,𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝐵
𝐴∙𝐹(𝑋1𝑗 ,𝑋3𝑗)
 ,                     (10) 
 
The share of citizens participating in the funded pension system must be above minimal value 
X4j,min. In this case, RR will grow in proportion to X4j. 
Graph 1 represents the dependence of minimal values of this share of citizens 
(X4j,min) on the effective retirement age (X1j) and investment returns (X3j) for the male 
population (the female population looks similar and is therefore omitted for the sake of 
space). It is evident that to maximize the target function we need a sufficiently high 
proportion of people participating in the funded pension system. For instance, at present 
men’s effective retirement age is 54.5 years and the investment returns are around X3 = 
−0.5%, which means that in order to increase RR it is necessary to attract over 65% of the 
population to participate in the funded pension system. Such a situation is unattainable 
because of the negative investment returns and the consequent erosion of pension savings. If 
the investment returns become positive, then the population share required to participate in 
the funded pension system will become smaller. 
The weight of the funded pension component is undoubtedly one of the state’s main 
tools to regulate the pension system. Expression (4) demonstrates that the target function is 
directly proportional to variable X2j, corresponding to this system parameter. However, if 
condition (9) is not met and the expression in curly brackets in (4) becomes negative, it is 
possible to reduce the negative impact of other variables on RR by assuming that the weight 
of the funded component equals zero, which means that it is not feasible to preserve the funded 
pension system in this case. 
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Graph 1. Dependence of the lower limit of the value range of variable X4j (the share of 
citizens participating in the funded pension system) on the effective retirement age (X1j) and 
investment returns (X3j) for female (top) and male (bottom) populations 
 
If the expression in curly brackets of (4) has a positive value, then an increase in the 
weight of the funded pension component will enhance the growth in the target function. 
Therefore 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑗 → ∞, 𝑓𝑜𝑟  {
𝑋2𝑗 ↑ ,   𝑋2𝑗 > 0,   𝑋4𝑗 ≥
𝐵
𝐹(𝑋1𝑗 ,𝑋3𝑗)∙𝐴
𝑋2𝑗 = 0,   𝑋4𝑗 <
𝐵
𝐹(𝑋1𝑗 ,𝑋3𝑗)∙𝐴
                      (11) 
 
Thus, a pension system is a system of interconnected parameters, open both for 
internal and external impact. To achieve high values of the target function (RRj), it is essential 
to meet a number of conditions and restrictions on the given parameters. Our analysis has 
shown that the growth of each separate parameter (effective retirement age, returns of pension 
savings investments, the share of the population participating in the funded pension system 
and the weight of the funded pension component) enhances the growth in RR. However, this 
is not only a criterion that serves as an indicator of the system’s optimality but is also a 
combination of their values. For example, the feasibility of the funded pension component can 
be checked by condition (9), which contains three out of four given parameters and sets the 
share of citizens participating in the funded pension system with the specified investment 
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returns and the effective retirement age. If the investment returns are negative and the funded 
pension system loses its participants, then this condition will not be met and the funded 
pension system will be rendered infeasible, which will result in the need to reconsider all the 
parameters. 
Before we start discussing alternative methods of finding the parameters of the 
pension system’s target functions, let us summarize the results of our analysis and describe 
the conditions which will allow us to maximize RRj as one of the core indicators of a pension 
system. According to expressions (4), (6), (8) and (9), an increase in the resulting function 
(RRj) can be achieved the following ways: 
1. By raising the legal retirement age. This might imply an increase in the effective 
retirement age or cancellation of early retirement for specific groups. This is an 
effective but extremely unpopular measure in pension system regulation; 
2. By increasing returns from investments of pension savings, which is restricted by 
the regulating legal acts in the pension sphere; 
3. By increasing the weight of the funded pension component. This measure will be 
effective only if the share of citizens participating in the funded pension system 
exceeds a certain threshold value, which can be calculated according to (10); 
4. By increasing the share of people participating in the funded pension system, which 
is possible only if the returns from investments of pension savings are positive. 
The summary of our results is demonstrated by the following expression: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑗 → ∞, 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑋2𝑗 → 1;
𝑋1𝑗 → 𝐿𝑗;
𝑋3𝑗 ↑;
𝑋2𝑗 ↑ ,   𝑋3𝑗 > 0,   𝑋4𝑗 ≥
𝐵
𝐴∙𝐹(𝑋1𝑗 ,𝑋3𝑗)
;
𝑋2𝑗 = 0,   𝑋3𝑗 < 0,    𝑋4𝑗 <
𝐵
𝐴∙𝐹(𝑋1𝑗 ,𝑋3𝑗)
.
   12 
 
An important institutional conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis described 
above is the following: the point is not to eliminate the funded pension component but to 
enhance the institutional regulation, which would enable the government to attract more 
people to the funded pension system. This can be achieved by increasing the returns from 
investing pension savings and by the state’s co-funding of the funded pension component. 
The results presented in (12) cannot serve as a complete answer to the question of 
finding the optimal values for a pension system and of maximizing its RR. As we have 
already pointed out when discussing expression (4), this can be achieved by applying 
alternative methods, as we see in the next section. 
3. Discussion of the optimization of a pension system 
To develop a pension system and determine its optimal parameters, we make an 
assumption that the parameters in question are random variables which can take values in the 
range sets discussed in the previous section. At the same time, we know that variables take 
values in accordance with certain distribution laws that might be Gaussian, lognormal, gamma 
or chi- square. To get a feeling of the distribution, we have to analyze the statistical data on 
the investment returns and the effective retirement age. 
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For the analysis of investment returns, we use the annual returns of 68 companies 
which managed investments of pension savings in the period between 2004 and 2014. After 
computing the average returns of pension savings for each of the 68 companies and adjusting 
the calculated values of the nominal investment returns to the annual average inflation of 
5.46% in the given period (Official Website of the Federal Public Statistics Service of the 
Russian Federation. Access mode: www.gks.ru.), we computed the kernel density estimator 
(KDE) with the Gaussian kernel (with the bandwidth estimated via Silvermans’ rule of 
thumb) of the investment returns in the 2004-2014 period (see Graph 2). Even a simple visual 
inspection implies that the current variable follows none of the standard distributions: 
different tests for Gaussian, t and stable distributions were rejected on the high significance 
level. Therefore, for further analysis a nonparametric distribution function is used. Let us 
analyze the distribution of the effective retirement age. It is important to recall that the 
effective retirement age is not an independent random value, as it is determined by life 
expectancy at age 60. We consider life expectancy at age 60 instead of life expectancy at the 
effective retirement age because of the existence of data. When analyzing the distribution of 
the effective retirement age, one needs to take into account the relation between the life 
expectancy and the retirement age and thus their fraction. This indicator is analyzed 
separately for men and women in nineteen OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Great Britain, 
Hungary, Germany, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Slovenia, the USA, the Czech Republic, France, Switzerland, Sweden and Japan. The data for 
the analysis of men’s and women’s retirement age are shown in Table 1. In Table 1 is Data 
for retirement age and life expectancy for pensioners. On the basis of the present tables, we 
find the distribution of life expectancy/retirement age, which we apply during modelling.   
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Graph 2. Probability density of the real returns from the investment of pension savings in the 
period between 2004 and 2014 
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Table 1. Retirement age and the life expectancy for men and women in OECD countries 
 
 
Source: authors' calculations based on data of OECD a Glance 2013: OECD and G20 
Indicators, OECD Publishing. Access mode: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2013-
14-en. last accessed date: 24.01.2014. 
 
The KDE (with Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth estimated via Silvermans’ rule of 
thumb) of women’s (in red) and men’s (in blue) life expectancy at 60 over the effective 
retirement age for OECD countries in 2010 is given in Graph 3. Both estimators have a 
slightly skewed distribution which rejects all the common symmetric distributions (like 
Gaussian, t, family, etc.). In the further study, we also use the empirical distribution for this 
variable. A comparative analysis of the ratio between men’s and women’s life expectancy at 
60 to the effective retirement age has allowed us to come to a conclusion that is significant for 
the institutional regulation of the Russian pension system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Eff. Ret. age          Life exp. at 60           
Life exp.at 60
Eff.Ret.age
 
 men women men women men women 
Australia 64.9 62.9 84.4 86.8 1.30 1.38 
Austria 61.9 59.4 82.2 85.9 1.33 1.45 
Canada 63.8 62.5 83.5 86.4 1.31 1.38 
Czech Republic 63.1 59.8 79.8 83.9 1.26 1.40 
France 59.7 60.0 83.5 87.7 1.40 1.46 
Germany 62.1 61.6 81.9 85.4 1.32 1.39 
Hungary 60.9 59.6 77.7 82.9 1.28 1.39 
Italy 61.1 60.5 83.3 86.6 1.36 1.43 
Japan 69.1 66.7 83.4 88.7 1.21 1.33 
Luxembourg 57.6 59.6 82.5 85.9 1.43 1.44 
Mexico 72.3 68.7 81.1 83.8 1.12 1.22 
Netherlands 63.6 62.3 82.6 85.7 1.30 1.37 
Norway 64.8 64.3 82.6 85.7 1.27 1.33 
Poland 62.3 60.2 89.2 84.0 1.43 1.40 
Slovenia 62.9 60.6 78.0 82.9 1.24 1.37 
Sweden 66.1 64.2 83.3 85.8 1.26 1.34 
Switzerland 66.1 63.9 83.9 87.0 1.27 1.36 
United Kingdom 63.7 63.2 82.7 85.3 1.30 1.35 
United States 65.0 65.0 82.1 85.0 1.26 1.31 
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Graph 3. KDE of the ratio of women’s (red) and men’s (blue) life expectancy over retirement 
age for OECD countries in 2010 
 
In accordance with the demographic forecast made by the Federal State Statistics 
Service, the ratio between  life expectancy at 60 and effective retirement age is 1.5 and 1.61 
for men and women respectively. In OECD countries, for men this range is (1.1; 1.4); for 
women, (1.2; 1.5). These results demonstrate that in Russia, taking into consideration men’s 
and women’s life expectancy at 60, the effective retirement age is too low for men and 
women. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to find enough statistical data on the other two 
indicators (the weight of the funded component in pension provision and the average share of 
citizens participating in the funded pension system), which prevented us from reaching any 
statistically significant conclusions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no recent research 
that addresses this problem. Therefore, when modelling the target function and specifying the 
optimal parameters of a pension system, we took them to be equal to 0.8, which, in general, 
represents the actual situation. 
The modelling of the optimal parameters of a pension system was done by mapping 
the bivariate distribution function of (X1j, X3j) onto formula (4), thus highlighting the most 
probable values of RR for the future most probable values of the investment returns and 
effective retirement age. Next, we found the extremum of the function considering the 
probability distribution of the values of the variables and identified the optimal parameters. 
The results of the objective function modelling (RRj) take into account the distribution 
of the variables, the effective retirement age (X1j) and the investment returns (X3j) (see 
Figure 4, upper panel for women and lower panel for men). The dependency between the two 
variables X1j and X3j is taken into account as their joint density has been computed via the 
bivariate kernel density estimator with the product Gaussian kernel: both bandwidths are 
estimated via Silvermans’ rule of thumb. The weight of the funded component in the pension 
provision (X2j) and the share of people participating in the funded pension system (X4j) were 
set at 0.8. In the figures, the areas of different probability of achieving the target function 
values are highlighted by the red and blue colors: the red color corresponds to the most 
probable values while the blue refers to the least probable ones. 
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The discontinuity of the target function at the point where the investment returns are 
equal to zero can be explained by the singularity of function (4) at this point. When the 
investment returns (X3j) are approaching zero, function F (X1j, X3j) and, consequently, RRj 
tend to infinity: 
𝑋3𝑗 → 0 => 𝐹 (𝑋1𝑗 , 𝑋3𝑗) → ∞ => 𝑅𝑅𝑗 → ∞.  
 
As is seen from the figures, the increase in the effective retirement age (X1j) and the 
investment returns will also increase RR. Its minimal value for men is 0.2941, with the 
investment returns (X3j) being -1% and the effective retirement age 54.5 years. For women, 
the minimal RR is equal to 0.2851, with the investment returns being -1% and effective 
retirement age 52.6 years. With the real investment returns set at 0.38% (which is historically 
the largest value observed) and the effective retirement age 76.5 years, RR will reach its 
maximum value, 98.6. For women, at effective retirement age 81.1 years and investment 
returns set at 0.38%, RR will reach the maximum at 148.1. This is logical, as the effective 
retirement age tends to the life expectancy at 60 and the size of pension payments and RR 
tend to infinity. Therefore, we took the life expectancy minus one month in order to be 
bounded from infinity and as the pensions are paid on a monthly basis. However, if 
investment returns are set to 0.38% and effective retirement age for men to 68.0 years and for 
women to 69.2 years, RR becomes 1.04. If RR reaches 1.04 (which means that pension benefits 
will exceed the person’s level of wages before the retirement 1.04 times), then the insured 
person will find it much more profitable to retire rather than to continue working. Such a 
pension system will discourage people from working. 
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Graph 4. Dependence of RRj on the effective retirement age (X1j) and investment returns (X3j) 
for male (top) and female (bottom) population 
 
Therefore, we believe that our primary goal to maximize the main parameters of the 
pension system by changing its parameters must be adjusted and stated as “finding the 
optimal indicators of the pension system by changing its parameters in such a way that they 
will not negatively affect the labour market”. For the lowest optimal value of RR, we could 
use the ILO’s recommendations for the minimal RR (0.4) and as the upper limit we could use 
the average value of RR in the mandatory pension insurance programs in OECD countries, 
0.55 (www.ilo.stat). Thus, the task comes down to defining the region of the pension 
parameters which would keep RR in the range of RRj ∈ [0.4; 0.55]. According to the upper 
panel of Graph 4 (results for men), RR in the allowable range can be achieved if X3j ≥ 0.12%. 
The most probable values for effective retirement age, as we found earlier, are in the range 
between 60.5 and 64 years for men and 58 and 62 years for women (lower panel). However, if 
we decrease the effective retirement age in the most probable area we will decrease RR, 
which contradicts to our aim. If we also consider the most probable values of RR, the optimal 
parameters (investment returns and the effective retirement age) will be as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑗 ∈ [0.40; 0.55] 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑋1𝑗 ∈ [60.5;64]  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋3𝑗 ∈ [0.12%;0.18%] 
 
This means that we are most likely to achieve the RR recommended by the ILO in the 
range between 0.4 and 0.54 by increasing the average effective retirement age X1j to 60.5-
64 years and the real investment returns to 0.12-0.18%. For the women, the replacement 
coefficient lying in the same range of RRj ∈ [0.4; 0.55] recommended by ILO can be reached 
with the investment returns being in the range of X3j ∈ [0.12%; 0.18%] and the retirement age 
being X1j ∈ [58; 62]. Thus by conducting an intersection of the intervals, we obtain that 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑗 ∈ [0.40; 0.55] 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑋1𝑗 ∈ [58;62]  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋3𝑗 ∈ [0.12%;0.18%] 
 
Thus RR is exactly on the lower boundary of the interval suggested by the ILO. 
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The results we received agree with the World Bank’s recommendations that in a 
period characterized by declining birth rates and growing life expectancy, governments 
should give priority to the funded pension system rather than to the traditional distribution 
system while simultaneously raising the retirement age (Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt, 1999). 
Our results specify the share of the funded component in pension contributions and the 
corresponding increase in the retirement age necessary to optimize the pension system. We 
believe that if the negative effects of state regulation are eliminated and the funded 
component is introduced, it will be possible to minimize the inevitable rise in retirement age. 
For men, if the investment yields are [0.12; 0.18], it will be sufficient to increase the 
retirement age to [60.5; 64]; for women, to [58;62]. 
Conclusion 
Pension systems should be considered as non-stationary economic systems, which 
have parameters with varying probability. To take into account their dynamic impact on 
pension systems, we should consider the following groups of parameters: firstly, demographic 
parameters (the period of paying pension benefits, the period of pension savings, the numbers 
of the working population and retired citizens); secondly, investment parameters (the rate of 
investment returns obtained from investing pension savings, in decimal fractions); and thirdly, 
institutional parameters (the share of the population participating in voluntary funded pension 
programs and the share of expenditure on funding preferential pensions in the total 
expenditure of the state pension fund). 
Considering men’s and women’s life expectancy at 60 in Russia, the effective 
retirement age is set too low if compared to the average ratio life expectancy at 60 to the 
effective retirement age in OECD countries. The living standards for the retired population 
should be maintained at the average level of OECD countries determined by the ratio of the 
life expectancy at 60 to the effective retirement age, that is, the relative retirement period. In 
order to achieve these standards, women’s and men’s effective retirement age should be 
raised considerably. The most optimal effective retirement age for men would be between 
60.5 and 64 years, while for women between 58 and 62 years. 
The most probable values of the investment returns (without inflation) from pension 
savings invested in assets, based on the empirical distribution of the returns over 2004-2014, 
are in the interval (0.12%; 0.18%). Thus, even a slight increase in the investment returns will 
imply an increase in RRj. In the case of negative investment returns on pension savings and 
with a small proportion of the population participating in the funded pension system, it is 
counterproductive to support or create a funded pension system. In conditions of wage 
stagnation, the growth of RR and pension benefits can be achieved only by increasing the 
retirement age. By the increase of the effective retirement age to the average life expectancy 
at 60, RR tends towards infinity. RR for men can be raised to be in the interval between 
0.4 and 0.55 (recommended by ILO) by increasing the effective retirement age to be in the 
interval between 60.5 and 64 years or by increasing the investment returns to 0.12-0.18%. For 
women, the retirement age should be between 58 and 62 years or the investment returns 
should not be below 0.12%. 
If the investment returns are negative and the share of people participating in the 
funded pension component is small, it is better to apply institutional regulation, which would 
increase the returns and make this part of the pension system more attractive for the 
population, rather than eliminate the funded pension component.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1. Ranges of Parameters in Target Functions of Pension Benefits and the Replacement 
Rate of the Pension System  
 
Type of risk 
impact 
Symbol 
in the 
formula 
Value of the 
symbol 
Range of 
coefficient  
values  
Note 
Values 
for men 
Values 
for 
women 
Demographic 
risks 
tnj 
Period of pension 
savings at present 
(in years) 
35.6 (men) 
/30,6 (women) 
Period of pension savings = 
retirement age (w). 55 for 
women and 60 for men – the 
age of starting working life (v) 
(24.4 as of 2014) = 35.6 (men)/ 
30.6 (women) 
35.6 30.6 
tni 
Period of pension 
savings in the 
future (in years) 
[0; retirement 
age (w) – age 
of starting 
working life 
(v)] 
1) Age of starting working life 
(v) in 2014 was 24.4 years and 
we assumed it as a constant in 
our model  
2) Retirement age (w) – 
variable (see The description 
of the variables) 
w- 24,4 
tvj 
Payment period 
at present (in 
years) 
21.55 (men) / 
24.56 (women) 
[the United 
Nations data on  
life expectancy 
in 2014] 
Life age (Li) = const 
[minimum on demographic 
forecast; a maximum on 
demographic forecast of the 
United Nations (see 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STA
TS/table4c6.html) 
21.55 24.56 
tvi 
Payment period 
in future (in 
years) 
 [0; life age – 
retirement 
age- w]  
Payment period in future = life 
expectancy for pensioners (Lj) 
in future 82.64 (men) / 85.65 
(women) in the United 
Nations (see 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STA
TS/table4c6.html minus the 
retirement age in future – 
variable (see the description of 
the variables) 
[82.64 -
w] 
[85.65 -
w] 
Kj 
The number of 
working-age 
population j year 
at present as in 
2014, in million 
people 
86 mln. people 
[SCS RF] 
The number of working-age 
population in year j (at 
present) as in 2014 
86 
Ki 
The number of 
working-age 
population in 
future (million 
people) 
[73;80]  
[SCS RF]  
This can take any value in the 
range from the pessimistic 
forecast of the Russian SCS in 
2030 to the optimistic forecast 
[73;80] 
nj 
The number of 
pensioners at 
present (million 
people) 
32 [SCS RF] 
The number of pensioners as 
of 2014 
32 
ni 
The number of 
pensioners in 
future (million 
people) 
[36; 41] 
This can take any value in the 
range from the pessimistic 
forecast of the Russian SCS in 
2030 to the optimistic forecast 
[36; 41] [36; 41] 
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Institutional 
risks 
duz 
The share of 
unearmarked 
spendings PFR 
0.0247 
[calculated by 
the author on 
the basis of 
the budget of 
PFR]* 
This ratio is the amount of 
pensions (all pensions except 
insurance, funded and basic) to 
the sum of the costs of PFR + 
ratio of administrative expenses 
to the sum of the costs of PFR 
[Federal Law on Budget of the 
Pension Fund of the Russian 
Federation in 2014] 
0.0247 
dlp 
The share of 
pensions to 
privileged 
categories of 
citizens of PFR 
Investment 
risks 
α 
Investment yields 
at present 
expressed as a 
decimal 
-0,004  
[Official site of 
the Ministry of 
Finance 
www.minfin.ru] 
The average yield of pension 
investments in the period from 
2004 to 2014  
-0,004 
  
PZj 
The replacement 
rate of pensions 
at present 
0.34  
[Official site 
of the Pension 
Fund RF 
www.pfrf.ru] 
The replacement rate of 
pensions as in 2014 [PFR] 
0.34 
*Note: Calculated by the authors according to the RPF in 2014 as the ratio of non-insurance costs (without 
insurance, funded and basic pensions) to total costs and forecast of the United Nations (see 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html). 
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Appendix 2 
 
Abbreviations 
 
ILO – the International Labour Organization 
IRR – the internal rate of return 
RR – the replacement rate 
OLG Model – overlapping generations model 
PAYG – Pay-as-you-go pension system  is the unfunded pension system 
VAR – the Value- at-Risk 
 
